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NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF MENTAL DISTRESS:
REACTION TO DILLON v. LEGG IN CALIFORNIA
AND OTHER STATES
An unfortunate collateral fact of all too many tortious accidents
is the presence of bystanders who observe the gruesome scene. In
many situations, such as where a small child is struck by a negligently
driven automobile, the bystander is a close relative of the accident vic-
tim. As a result of witnessing such a tragic event, the bystander may
suffer various physical and/or mental infirmities, such as severe ner-
vous trauma or respiratory and cardiac ailments. The law has been
slow in providing protection for such injuries and generally compen-
satory relief is allowed only if the bystander is able to satisfy certain
stringent prerequisites. In 1968, the California Supreme Court signifi-
cantly relaxed its own standards for such recovery by purportedly
adopting foreseeability as the guideline against which recovery would
be measured. Since this decision, Dillon v. Legg,' numerous states
have rejected this innovative approach and only two decisions have
accepted this position; one with modifications. Thus, it seems appro-
priate to reconsider the California position and the objections which
apparently make it unacceptable to many American courts.
By the first quarter of this century, many courts still did not allow
any recovery for mental distress without accompanying physical inju-
ries, regardless of whether such mental distress was intentionally or
negligently caused.2 The denial of relief was rationalized on the
grounds that mental ailments were not equivalent to physical injuries
and therefore did not merit legal redress.3 However, as courts began
to realize the harshness and irrationality of such a complete denial
of recovery, some courts allowed relief if the plaintiff suffered physical
impact.4  This prerequisite eventually was relaxed to enable a person
to recover if he could establish that he was in a "zone of imminent
danger," even though he had never suffered any actual physical im-
pact.5
1. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
2. See generally Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 220 (1951).
3. J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS, 149 (4th ed. 1971).
4. West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Liebig, 79 I11. App. 567 (1898); Spade v. Lynn
& Boston R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897); Brisboise v. Kansas City Pub.
Serv. Co., 303 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. 1957); Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d
263 (1958).
5. See Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513,
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These restrictions reflect prevailing fears about the effect of al-
lowing recovery for mental distress resulting from the negligence of
another. In Dillon v. Legg,6 California took the lead in rejecting this
anachronistic reasoning by holding that liability is imposed where the
plaintiff's injury is "foreseeable" to the defendant at the time of his
negligent act.7  The court thus rejected the prevailing standards which
the courts of this country were using to limit recovery, and instead
adopted one of the basic principles of negligence law.
This note will trace the various historical theories and attitudes
which have influenced court decisions. As an alternative to such an
approach, Dillon will be analyzed. The note will also analyze the ap-
proaches which other jurisdictions have used in dealing with the prob-
lem subsequent to the Dillon decision. Furthermore, various Cali-
fornia cases decided subsequent to Dillon will be discussed in an at-
tempt to ascertain whether these cases have actually applied the Dillon
formula or, instead, have constructed an arbitrary set of rules with
which to handle this problem. In light of this analysis, the note will
discuss whether the forseeability test announced in Dillon includes the
foreseeability of the plaintiff's presence at the scene of the accident,
and, if it does not, whether such an added restriction should also be
adopted.
Background: Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress
Historical Influences
The entire field of emotional distress has been plagued by three
concerns which have resulted in arbitrary limitations being placed upon
the recovery for the negligent infliction of mental distress caused by
fear for another's safety. The primary concern of the early courts was
that the allowance of recovery in such cases would result in an ava-
lanche of fraudulent cases.8 Faced with the tremendous advances
which medical science has made in recent years, particularly in the
area of mental disorders, the clear tendency today rejects this reason
for limiting recovery. 9
29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963); Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 58 Del. 454, 210 A.2d 709
(1965); Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952); Falzone v. Busch,
45 NJ. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965); Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84
(1970); Guilmette v. Alexander, 128 Vt. 116, 259 A.2d 12 (1969); Waube v. Warring-
ton, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
6. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
7. See text accompanying note 28 infra.
8. See, e.g., Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88
(1897); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896); Waube v. War-
rington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935); Victorian Ry. Comm. v. Coultas, 13
App. Cas. 222 (P.C. 1888).
9. W. PNossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 54, at 328 (4th ed. 1971).
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A second reason which courts have used to explain their limita-
tions of such recovery is that, absent these restrictions, the courts
would be deluged with a voluminous increase in litigation. 10 This ra-
tionale is apparently based on an expected increase in fraudulent ac-
tions coupled with an increase due to actions based on mental distress
of a trivial nature. The argument fails on two counts. First, those
courts which have relaxed their limitations on recovery of this type
have not experienced any substantial increase in litigation." Sec-
ondly, aside from the practical considerations, several courts have
noted that a court may not refuse to adjudicate a particular type of
case simply because, by so doing, its docket may increase. The duty
of a court is to redress legal wrongs "and it is a pitiful confession of
incompetence on the part of any court of justice to deny relief upon
the ground that it will give the court too much work to do."12  Thus,
a court which denies recovery for this reason is doing so for unsub-
stantiated administrative reasons wholly unrelated to the primary pur-
pose of the law, i.e., the redress of legal wrongs.
A third reason for denying recovery, and the one which seems
most valid, rests in the fear that once the rigid lines drawn by the
arbitrary restrictions which courts have often used are erased, a negli-
gent defendant may be rendered susceptible to potentially unlimited
liability."3 Such a concern is a real danger and presents the primary
argument against extending liability.
10. See, e.g., Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
11. E.g., Okrina v. Midwestern Corp., 282 Minn. 400, 405, 165 N.W.2d 259, 263
(1969). In Lambert, Tort Liability for Psychic Injuries, 41 B.U.L. RYEv. 584, 592
(1961), the author asserts: 'The truth of the matter is that the feared flood tide of
litigation has simply not appeared in states following the majority rule allowing recov-
ery of psychic injuries without impact. The volume of litigation has been heaviest in
states following the Mitchell doctrine and its impact rule."
12. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH.
L. REv. 874, 877 (1939). See Hopper v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 314, 315 (D.
Colo. 1965); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 736, 441 P.2d 912, 917-18, 69 Cal. Rptr.
72, 77-78 (1968); Green v. Shoemaker & Co., 111 Md. 69, 81, 73 A. 688, 692 (1909);
Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 241-42, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 38
(1961); Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 412-13, 261 A.2d 84, 89 (1970). The
court in Dillon asserted that "[c]ourts not only compromise their basic responsibility
to decide the merits of each case individually but destroy the public's confidence in
them by using the broad broom of 'administrative convenience' to sweep away a class
of claims a number of which are admittedly meritorious." 68 Cal. 2d at 737, 441
P.2d at 918, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
13. In Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 613, 258 N.W. 497, 501 (1935),
the court rejected an appeal to abolish the zone-of-danger theory which had theretofore
been applied in cases of mental distress in favor of a more liberal rule for recovery,
indicating that if it adopted the rule permitting the recovery of a plaintiff outside the
zone of physical danger, unlimited liability would loom in the near future. "[The
liability imposed by such a doctrine is wholly out of proportion to the culpability of
the negligent tort-feasor, would put an unreasonable burden upon users of the highway,
[Vol. 25
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This concern, however, must be balanced with a recognition of
the plight of the injured plaintiff. Most courts have attempted to
strike such a balance by abandoning the position of complete denial
of recovery for the negligent infliction of emotional distress,14 while
limiting liability by imposing arbitrary restrictions on recovery. The
two most popular rules for accomplishing this balance are called the
"zone-of-danger" test -and the "impact" rule.
The impact rule permits recovery only if the plaintiff can show
that he suffered some contemporaneous physical impact in conjunction
with the mental suffering. The arbitrary nature of this test can be
best appreciated by considering how far some courts have gone to find
an "impact." The case of Morton v. Stack'5 provides a good example.
There, the highest court of Ohio found an "impact" when smoke
passed through the nostrils of the plaintiff!' 6
Although the impact rule was the majority opinion for many
years, it has recently yielded this place of prominence to the "zone-
of-danger" theory. This theory enables a plaintiff to recover if he
can prove that he was in a physical zone of peril and did fear for
his own safety. Any allegation which states that the plaintiff's fear
was for the safety of another rather than for the safety of the plaintiff
himself is sufficient to dismiss the cause of action.' Many states,' 8
open the way to fraudulent claims, and enter a field that has no sensible or just stop-
ping point." It should be noted that the same argument was advanced by Justice Van
Voorhis in his dissent in Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.
2d 34 (1961). Prosser has stated the problem most succinctly: "It would be an en-
tirely unreasonable burden on all human activity if the defendant who has endangered
one man were to be compelled to pay for the lacerated feelings of every other person
disturbed by reason of it, including every bystander shocked at an accident, and every
distant relative of the person injured, as well as his friends." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
OF Tim LAw oF TORTS, § 54, at 334 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as THE LAW OF
TORTS].
14. See, e.g., Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d
513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
15. 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930). See also Homans v. Boston Elevated
Ry., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902) (slight bump against seat); Spade v. Lynn
& Boston R.R., 172 Mass. 488, 52 N.E. 747 (1899) (slight blow); Porter v. Delaware,
L. & W.R.R., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 A. 860 (1906) (dust in eyes); Sawyer v. Dougherty,
286 App. Div. 1061, 144 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1955) (blast of air filled with glass); Jones
v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., 23 App. Div. 141, 48 N.Y.S. 914 (1897) (impact found
by small light bulb falling on plaintiff's head).
16. 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930).
17. See, e.g., Maury v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Cal. 1956); Reed
v. Moore, 156 Cal. App. 2d 43, 319 P.2d 80 (1957); Kelly v. Fretz, 19 Cal. App.
2d 356, 65 P.2d 914 (1937); Lessard v. Tarca, 20 Conn. Supp. 295, 133 A.2d 625
(1957); Keyes v. Minneapolis & St. L R.R., 36 Minn. 290, 30 N.W. 888 (1886);
Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 2.49 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969).
18. See, e.g., Whetham v. Bismarck, 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972); Niederman
v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970); Guilmette v. Alexander, 128 Vt. 116,
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including California, 9 have adhered to the zone-of-danger theory at
one time or another, and it represents the majority viewpoint in this
country today.20
Dillon v. Legg
In 1968 the California Supreme Court rendered the landmark
decision of Dillon v. Legg,21 which held that the zone-of-danger
theory was too arbitrary to be an effective guideline with which to
determine liability. The court noted that the impact rule had already
been rejected in California22 and further observed that the zone-of-
danger theory was untenable in light of the rejection of the impact
rule because "the only reason for the requirement of presence in that
zone lies in the fact that one within it will fear the danger of impact. '23
The facts of the case presented the Supreme Court with an ideal
opportunity to overthrow the zone-of-danger theory. Mrs. Dillon and
her daughter, Cheryl, witnessed the automobile accident in which Mrs.
Dillon's infant daughter, Erin, was killed because of the negligent driv-
ing of the defendant. However, whereas Cheryl may have been
within the zone of danger so as to enable her to recover for the mental
anguish caused by witnessing the negligent killing of her sister, Mrs.
Dillon, the deceased infant's mother, was not in any zone of danger
to herself. Upon the defendant's motion to dismiss the case for failure
to state a cause of action, the trial court granted the motion with re-
spect to the mother's claim, but denied it as to the daughter's action.
The California Supreme Court reversed the trial court's dismissal of
the mother's cause of action, holding that it could "hardly justify relief
to the sister for trauma which she suffered upon apprehension of the
child's death and yet deny it to the mother merely because of a hap-
penstance that the sister was some few yards closer to the accident. 2 4
The court adopted the position that liability for the negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress would depend upon whether such injuries
259 A.2d 12 (1969); Klassa v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 273 Wis. 176, 77 N.W.2d
397 (1956).
19. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29
Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
20. See Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952); Tobin v. Gross-
man, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969); Niederman v. Brod-
sky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS,
18.4 at 1034 (1956) [hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAMES]; 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 143
(1959).
21. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
22. Id. at 733, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75, citing Cook v. Maier, 33
Cal. App. 2d 581, 92 P.2d 434 (1939).
23. 68 Cal. 2d at 733, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75 (1968).
24. Id.
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were foreseeable to the defendant at the time of the accident.25 The
court concluded that no strict rule defining the limitations on liability
could be established but that the parameters would have to be set
on a case-by-case basis. 26  However the fear of unlimited liability was
voiced by the Dillon court when it cautioned that "[i]n order to limit
the otherwise potentially infinite liability which would follow every
negligent act, the law of -torts holds defendant amenable only for inju-
ries to others which to defendant at the time were reasonably foresee-
able."'27  Furthermore, the court established three factors which were
to act as general determinants of liability. Those factors were:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the acci-
dent as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it.
(2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional im-
pact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observ-
ance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident
from others after its occurrence.
(3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as
contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the presence of
only a distant relationship.
28
The court also stated that future courts would have to establish bound-
aries to liability in different fact situations which might present more
difficult problems than the facts presented in the Dillon case.
29
Reaction to Dillon Outside California
The reaction to the doctrine of recovery announced in Dillion has
been mixed. Soon after its adoption, two states, fearing that such a
theory would subject a negligent defendant to infinite liability, declined
to follow California's lead. Tobin v. Grossman0 involved the mental
25. Id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. "Since the chief element
in determining whether defendant owes a duty or an obligation to plaintiff is the fore-
seeability of the risk, that factor will be of prime concern in every case."
26. "We cannot now predetermine defendant's obligation in every situation by a
fixed category; no immutable rule can establish the extent of that obligation for every
circumstance for the future." Id.
27. Id. at 739, 441 P.2d at 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
28. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
29. "Such reasonable foreseeability does not turn on whether the particular plain-
tiff [sic] as an individual would have in actuality foreseen the exact accident and loss;
it contemplates that courts, on a case-to-case basis, analyzing all the circumstances, will
decide what the ordinary man under such circumstances should reasonably have fore-
seen. The courts thus mark out the areas of liability, excluding the remote and unex-
pected.
In future cases the courts will draw lines of demarcation upon facts more subtle
than the compelling ones alleged in the complaint before us." Id. at 741, 441 P.2d
at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
30. 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969).
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distress suffered by a mother arising out of the traffic accident in which
her two-year-old son was seriously injured. The facts differed from
those in Dillon in that the plaintiff did not witness the accident because
she was inside a neighbor's house. She ran outside when she heard
the screech of the brakes, only to discover her seriously injured son
lying on the ground.
New York has already rejected the impact rule3 in favor of the
zone-of-danger test. In rejecting the opportunity to abandon the zone-
of-danger rule in favor of the Dillon approach, Tobin evidenced the
ever-present fear of the possibility of unlimited liability arising out of
such cases. In refusing to adopt the foreseeability approach, the New
York court stated:
The problem of unlimited liability is suggested by the unforseeable
consequence of extending recovery for harm to others than those
directly involved in the accident. If foreseeability be the sole
test, then once liability is extended the logic of the principle would
not and could not remain confined. It would extend to older chil-
dren, fathers, grandparents, relatives, or others in loco parentis,
and even to sensitive caretakers, or even other affected by-
standers.
32
Viewing such an extension of liability with alarm, the New York Court
of Appeals decided to retain the zone-of-danger rule.
The Vermont Supreme Court, in Guilmette v. Alexander,33 held
that no recovery would be allowed to plaintiffs located out of the zone
of danger. The facts of this case were similar to Dillon in that the
plaintiff was suing for physical injuries caused by the mental distress
suffered by her as a result of witnessing her young daughter being
struck by an automobile as she disembarked a school bus in front of
her house. The plaintiff had come to the front porch to greet her
daughter.
Viewing the case as a question of a legal duty owing to the plain-
tiff, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded that no legal duty existed
for the protection of one outside the zone of danger. Thus, one lo-
cated in the zone of danger suffers a breach of a duty to him in the
sense that his own personal safety is threatened; yet one located out
of the zone of danger has no threat to his safety and, without a viola-
tion of any other legally protected right, may not recover for physical
injuries caused by the negligently inflicted mental distress.
In January 1970, eighteen months after Dillon had been decided,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined, in Niederman v. Brod-
31. Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).
32. 24 N.Y.2d at 616, 249 N.E.2d at 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
33. 128 Vt. 116, 259 A.2d 12 (1969).
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sky,34 that the time had arrived to review its past decisions 5 which
had required impact in order to allow recovery. The facts indicate
that the plaintiff witnessed the automobile accident in which his son
was struck by a car and severely injured. The plaintiff was standing
next to his son at the time of the accident but suffered no impact.
The plaintiff subsequently suffered severe chest pains, required five
weeks hospitalization, and was diagnosed as having sustained acute
coronary insufficiency, coronary failure, angina pectoris, and possible
myocardial infarction.
Despite the existence of the Dillon decision, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court apparently chose to ignore the innovative approach
taken by California, and it adopted the zone-of-danger rule with-
out even mentioning Dillon. The opinion rejected all arguments in
favor of retaining the impact rule, but apparently the court was un-
willing to also reject the zone-of-danger rule, which Dillon had held
to be a mere derivative of the impact doctrine.
In Aragon v. Speelman, 0 a case of first impression in New Mex-
ico, the court refused to allow recovery because the plaintiff expe-
rienced no physical injury resulting from -the mental distress. However,
the New Mexico Supreme Court indicated that it was limiting its de-
cision to the facts of the case, and that no ruling was being made
on the liability which might be imposed under Dillon facts if some
physical manifestation were present.
Four years after Dillon, the Florida Court of Appeals, in Arcia
v. Altagracia Corp.,37 refused to review its past decisions and retained
the impact rule, one of a small minority of states to do so. 8  In ren-
dering its decision, the Florida appellate court did not mention Dillon
nor the approach which it advocated.
The first state to accept the philosophy of Dillon was Hawaii.
Rodrigues v. State39 involved the mental distress suffered by the plain-
tiffs as a result of the flooding of their home caused by the alleged
negligent construction of a road by the state of Hawaii. Without dis-
tinguishing between mental distress suffered by witnessing injury to
another person and that suffered by witnessing damage to one's
property, the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that the "interest in free-
34. 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970).
35. Knaub v. Gotwalt, 422 Pa. 267, 220 A.2d 646 (1966); Bosley v. Andrews,
393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958); Huston v. Freemansburg Borough, 212 Pa. 548,
61 A. 1022, 3 L.R.A. (n.s.) 49 (1905); Ewing v. Pittsburgh C. & St. L. Ry., 147 Pa.
40, 23 A. 340, 14 L.R.A. 666 (1892).
36. 83 N.M. 285, 491 P.2d 173 (1971).
37. 264 So. 2d 865 (Fla. App. 1972).
38. See generally Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 134 (1959).
39. 52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970).
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dom from negligent infliction of serious mental distress is entitled to
independent legal protection."4  The Hawaii court concluded that the
appropriate standard to be applied in such cases was that of the "rea-
sonable man of ordinary prudence," and the jury would be compelled
to decide each case on its facts to determine if "a reasonable man,
normally constituted, would be unable to cope adequately with the
mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the case."' 1  The
Hawaii Court went further than Dillon in two respects. Not only did
the court allow recovery without some physical manifestation of the
mental distress, 42 but it also employed the nebulous "reasonable man"
standard in ascertaining the foreseeability of injury instead of the
stringent guidelines laid down by Dillon.43
In D'Ambra v. United States, 44 a federal district court in Rhode
Island was confronted with facts which differed slightly from those in
Dillon. Gregory D'Ambra, a four-year-old child, was struck and killed
by a mail truck driven by Gaston Payette, who denied seeing the boy's
mother at any time prior to the accident. Mrs. D'Ambra had been
engaged in conversation with a neighbor when the accident occurred,
but was not within any zone of physical danger. She testified that
she heard the truck strike young Gregory and saw the truck drive over
the child. She commenced this action to recover damages for the in-
juries sustained as a result of the shock and physical manifestations
suffered by her from witnessing her infant son being struck by the
mail truck.4 5
The court, noting that Rhode Island state law allowed recovery
for the negligent infliction of mental distress and rejected the impact
rule,4 proceeded to the question of whether a bystander who did not
come within the zone of danger was entitled to recovery. After deter-
mining that Rhode Island law did not preclude recovery by such a
plaintiff, the federal court concluded that the theory embodied in Dil-
lon, with one additional requirement, would entitle a plaintiff to the
40. Id. at 174, 472 P.2d at 520.
41. Id. at 173, 472 P.2d at 520.
42. Two judges dissented to the reasoning used by the majority, citing Dillon as
being more restrictive than the case before them at that time. They asserted: "The
'reasonable man' test is no limitation on a plaintiff's (sic] potential liability for mental
suffering. In fact it only exacerbates the problem as juries can now be called upon
to give damages for mental distress in many tort cases without restraint. To be distin-
guished from the majority's standards are the presently accepted limits of requiring that
physical injury accompany mental disturbance or that the mental disturbance be caused
by peril or harm to another closely or intimately related to the person disturbed before
compensation will be allowed." Id. at 178-79, 472 P.2d at 523.
43. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
44. 354 F. Supp. 810 (D.R.I. 1973).
45. Id. at 812.
46. Id. at 814, citing Simone v. Rhode Island Co., 28 R.I. 186, 66 A. 202 (1907).
(Vol. 25
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recovery while also restricting the defendant's scope of liability.17
Evidently the judge did not feel that the three factors enunciated
in Dillon48 sufficiently restricted the liability to which a negligent actor
might be exposed, since he also required that the presence of the
plaintiff be foreseeable as a condition to recovery. Despite what one
commentator 9 in addition to Dillon5" had said, the trial judge did not
consider the presumption of foreseeability of the bystander's presence,
even in the cases of young children, to be valid. Instead, he felt that
an analysis of foreseeability of presence would be required in each
case based on the facts indigenous to that action."' In determining
whether the presence of the parent was foreseeable, Judge Pettine
enumerated several factors which trial courts might use in making their
determination. The factors which he considered relevant to the case
before him were: 1) the age of the child, 2) the type of neighborhood
in which the accident occurred, 3) the familiarity of the tortfeasor
with the neighborhood, 4) the time of day, and 5) all other circum-
stances which would have put the tortfeasor on notice of the likely
presence of the plaintiff."' The court concluded that the factors set
forth in Dillon, coupled with its own prerequisite of the foreseeability
of .the presence of the plaintiff would be sufficient to render liability
finite.5 3  The true importance of D'Ambra is the emphasis which it
placed on the foreseeability of the presence of the plaintiff, an aug-
mentation to the foreseeability of injury which Dillon stressed.
Thus, in the six years since Dillon was written, only two courts
outside California have accepted the approach taken therein. One
court seems totally unphased by concerns of unlimited liability, while
the other has taken cognizance of the continuing fear over unlimited
liability and has attempted to remedy this fear through a rational aug-
mentation of the Dillon formula.
The almost total rejection of Dillon outside California is perhaps
more understandable when one has examined the post-Dillon cases
in California.
Archibald v. Braverman
The first California case to apply the Dillon theory was Archibald
47. "IT]his Court, unlike the court in Tobin, believes that the criteria set forth
in Dillon for evaluating the foreseeability of the injury sufficiently serve to define the
parameters of the cause of action, with one additional prerequisite-that the presence
of the parent must also be foreseeable." 354 F. Supp. at 819.
48. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
49. THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 13, § 54, at 334.
50. 68 Cal. 2d at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
51. 354 F. Supp. at 819.
52. Id. at 820.
53. Id.
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v. Braverman.5 4  The complaint alleged that the defendant had negli-
gently sold gunpowder to the thirteen-year-old son of the plaintiff.
The gunpowder subsequently exploded in the boy's hand causing se-
vere injuries to him. His mother, who had not witnessed the explosion,
arrived at the scene within a few minutes and viewed the gruesome
consequences of the explosion. She sought compensation for the men-
tal distress and consequent physical injuries which she suffered from
seeing her son after the explosion.
The appellate court was confronted with a fact situation which
Dillon had foreseen and declined to decide at that time. In Dillon,
the plaintiff was present at the time of the accident and had actually
witnessed her daughter being struck by the automobile. Archibald in-
volved a plaintiff who had not witnessed the tragic accident which in-
jured her son, but had rushed to the scene within moments of the
explosion. The facts of this case thus required an extension of the
Dillon theory to enable the mother to recover. Despite the warning
given three months earlier in Tobin55 as to the possibility of unlimited
liability inherent in the Dillon doctrine, the appellate court held that
"[a] tortfeasor who causes injury to a child may reasonably expect that
that the mother will not be far distant and will, upon witnessing the
event, suffer emotional trauma." 56  Contrary to the position held by
the impact rule, the zone-of-danger doctrine, and even the factual sit-
uation present in Dillon, California law now appears to be that a plain-
tiff is not required to be present at the accident to recover for emo-
tional trauma.5 7  The courts of this state took only thirteen months
to abolish the zone-of-danger theory and to proceed to relieve the
plaintiff of the burden of even being on the scene at the time of the
accident. The fears of unlimited liability were seemingly material-
izing.
54. 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969).
55. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
56. 275 Cal. App. 2d at 256, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 725. The court not only held
that it was foreseeable to the defendant at the time of the accident, but also that the
injury was "contemporaneous" within the meaning of the second factor enunciated in
Dillon since the court felt that the shock of seeing the injured child immediately after
the accident would be equivalent to that of seeing the accident itself. But see D'Ambra
v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 810, 821 (D.R.I. 1973), in which the trial judge asserted
that "[t]he Archibald court failed to examine the question of the foreseeability of the
presence of the plaintiff mother, except to casually note that a tortfeasor who causes
injury to a child may reasonably expect the mother to be close by. To my mind, the
nearby presence of the mother of a thirteen year old boy who is buying gunpowder
is not reasonably foreseeable."
57. The petition by the defendant for a hearing before the California Supreme
Court was denied with only Justice McComb voting for a hearing. 275 Cal. App. 2d




Deboe v. Horn58 involved a plaintiff who had neither witnessed
the accident nor arrived at the scene within moments after the acci-
dent. Plaintiffs husband was severely injured in an automobile acci-
dent and rushed to the nearest hospital where he was diagnosed as
being totally paralyzed. Plaintiff was summoned -to the hospital and
informed of her husband's condition at that time. She claimed to have
suffered shock to her nervous system, emotional trauma, and mental
suffering resulting in physical injury as a consequence of her husband's
condition. She filed an action against the driver of the other automobile,
alleging that his negligence had caused her present mental and nervous
problems, but failing to state that she was in the general area of the
accident as required by Dillon. The trial judge sustained the defendant's
demurrer on the ground that the plaintiff did not allege that she had wit-
nessed the accident nor that she had come upon the scene moments
later.
This case thus presented the court of appeal with the opportunity
to extend further the doctrine in Dillon to cover those who were never
at the scene of the accident. The court might have abided by the
observation contained in Tobin to the effect that news of the death
or critical -injury of a loved one by word of mouth could create the
same emotional trauma as actually witnessing the accident, 59 thus al-
lowing recovery. Yet this would be directly contrary to the first two
determinants in Dillon,0 and the court did not so hold. Instead, the
court affirmed the trial judge on the ground that plaintiff's location
at the time of the accident must be specifically pleaded. The court
added dicta that even if the plaintiff had pleaded the facts of her claim,
no cause of action would exist as a matter of substantive law as she
was never present at the scene of the accident and merely was in-
formed of her husband's condition by others." Thus, California has
refused to extend liability beyond the spatial parameters established
in Archibald. Apparently a plaintiff must be within the near vicinity
of the accident in order to recover.02 Such a holding substantially
curbs the prospects of unlimited liability.
Wynne v. Orcutt Union School District
In Wynne v. Orcutt Union School District,63 the mother of a ter-
minally ill child had informed the boy's teacher of the child's condition.
58. 16 Cal. App. 3d 221, 94 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1971).
59. 24 N.Y.2d at 617, 249 N.E.2d at 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 560.
60. 68 Cal. 2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
61. 16 Cal. App. 3d 221, 94 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1971).
62. Accord, Schurk v. Christensen, 80 Wash. 2d 562, 497 P.2d 937 (1972).
63. 17 Cal. App. 3d 1108, 95 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1971).
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The teacher later disclosed the boy's condition to his classmates who
then constantly questioned the younster as to his disease and as to
when he would die. The boy, who had had no prior notice of his
condition, asked his parents if he had such a disease and if he would
soon die. They assured him that he did not have such a disease. Yet
the parents of the child alleged that they had suffered serious mental
anguish by the teacher's "negligent" action in disclosing such informa-
tion to the boy's classmates. The trial court dismissed the complaint
on the pleadings and the parents appealed.
The appellate court acknowledged the pain and the mental suf-
fering felt by the boy's parents due to their son's discovery of his condi-
tion, but noted that "personal suffering gives rise to a cause of action
only when it originates from a breach of duty by defendant and invades
a protected interest of plaintiff."' 4  The court held that no violation
of a duty had occurred because the teacher, absent any promise not
to divulge the information, was not under any duty to refrain from
telling others of the boy's condition. 5 The court then distinguished
the case from Dillon in that "the facts at bench did not fit the personal-
injury mold of Dillon. No accident occurred. No injury to the child
[was] alleged. No breach of a duty to the child [was] pleaded. A
fortiori, no breach of duty to the parents occurred." 6
With Wynne, the parameters of recovery which Dillon had estab-
lished became clearer in that recovery for mental distress would be
limited to the "personal-injury" type incident.67 The appellate court
considered an accident with resulting injury to the victim of that acci-
dent to be a prerequisite to recovery by another. Such a construction
is a strict application of the guidelines enumerated in Dillon which
specifically refer to accidents, thereby limiting, at least by implication,
recovery to such cases. Foreseeability was obviously not the prime
consideration in the determination of the Wynne case; for it does not
seem, upon the facts of this case, that the result was that unforesee-
able. Arguably, a fifth-grade teacher should recognize the immaturity
of her students at their age and should refrain from conduct which
would cause the boy or his parents this type of mental distress. The
64. Id. at 1110, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 459.
65. But see, HARPER & JAMES, supra note 20, § 18.4, at 1018. "mhe obligation
to refrain from . . . particular conduct is owed only to those who are foreseeably en-
dangered by the conduct and only with respect to those risks or hazards whose likeli-
hood made the conduct unreasonably dangerous. Duty, in other words, is measured
by the scope of the risk which negligent conduct foreseeably entails." Cf. CAL. CIV.
CODE 1714 (West 1973).
66. 17 Cal. App. 3d at 1111, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 459. This case was also denied
a hearing by the California Supreme Court with Justice Peters voting in favor of grant-
ing the hearing.
67. Compare Rodriguez v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970).
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significance of Wynne in the Dillon evolution is that the opinion evi-
dences the court's fear of unlimited liability. Although such mental
distress is reasonably foreseeable from the teacher's conduct, the court
limited recovery to those cases which "fit the Dillon mold."
Capelouto v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals
Recovery in the type of fact situation encountered in Dillon was
stressed again in Capelouto v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals.68  Plain-
tiffs were suing to recover alleged damages resulting from the negli-
gence of the hospital in allowing their newborn infant to contract a
salmonella infection. One count in the complaint was for the emo-
tional distress suffered by the parents as a result of witnessing the
lengthy development of the infection. The appellate court affirmed
the trial court's judgment for the defendant.69 Thus, recovery would
seem to be available only in cases of instantaneous accidents to which
the plaintiff is a witness or at which he arrives shortly thereafter.
Foreseeability of mental suffering cannot be conclusively denied
in cases such as Capelouto and Wynne, yet the courts have not deemed
such mental distress to be entitled to the protection of the law. Per-
haps the appellate judges in Capelouto and Wynne pondered the rami-
fications of allowing recovery in each of these cases, considered these
ramifications to be a prelude to unlimited liability on the part of negli-
gent defendants, and sought to limit such liability to the type of facts
presented in Dillon.
Conte v. San Jose
The most recent California case which has interpreted Dillon is
Conte v. City of San Jose.70  The case has encountered a most inter-
esting fate. The California Supreme Court denied a petition for a
hearing, and ordered the appellate court opinion to be excluded from
68. 7 Cal. 3d 889, 500 P.2d 880, 103 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1972); accord, Jansen v.
Children's Hospital Medical Center, 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 106 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1973).
69. In addition to this ground for denying recovery, both the appellate and the
California Supreme Court also held that recovery would be denied since the parents
had not alleged any physical injury as a result of the emotional trauma. Physical man-
ifestations of the injury are still a prerequisite for recovery. "Dillon makes clear that
a parent may recover for witnessing a child's distress only if the parent suffers actual
physical injury ... The record in the present case, while demonstrating that Kim's
parents suffered the emotional distress and mental anguish that is normal for parents
of a seriously ill or injured child, does not reveal that the parents suffered the actual
physical injury necessary for recovery under Dillon." 7 Cal. 3d at 892 n.1, 500 P.2d
at 882 n.1, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 858 n.1 (Citation omitted). See also Jansen v. Children's
Hospital Medical Center, 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 106 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1973); Employer's
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Foust, 29 Cal. App. 3d 382, 386, 105 Cal. Rptr. 505, 508 (1972).
70. Civil No. 30433 (1st Dist. Cal. Ct. App. July 24, 1973).
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the official reports. It is to be understood that the case is not offered
for its value as a precedent, but only for its persuasive reasoning.
The facts involved an eighteen-year-old girl who was struck by
an automobile. The accident occurred within a block of the girl's
home and her four brothers7' arrived at the scene of the accident
within moments of the accident. The girl's father never arrived at
the scene but was later informed of the tragedy and saw his daughter
at the hospital. Suits were filed against the city of San Jose alleging
that it had been negligent in planning the construction of the inter-
section, thereby creating a "death trap" for pedestrians using that in-
tersection. The trial judge sustained a demurrer to the father's cause
of action, in accordance with the principle enunciated in Deboe;7 2 no
recovery is allowed to a plaintiff who learns of the accident at a later
time but was never present at the scene of the accident. The cause
of action on behalf of the brothers was dismissed because the trial
court felt that siblings do not stand in a sufficiently close relationship
to the victim to warrant recovery. The trial judge would have allowed
recovery under Dillon only to a parent or child, an application which
would drastically curtail the rule announced in Dillon.
The court of appeal affirmed the sustaining of the demurrers,
both as to the father and to the brothers, but its reason for so doing
was radically different from that of the trial court. Even though the
father's recovery was barred by the ruling in Deboe, both his and the
brothers'73 causes of action failed for a more fundamental reason; a
lack of foreseeability of presence on the part of the defendant. The
court reasoned that the requisite foreseeability on the part of the de-
fendant was not that injury would occur to any pedestrian at the inter-
section, but that a young woman would be the victim and that her
brothers would be close at hand to witness the accident or its conse-
quences shortly after its occurrence. Relying on the Dillon court's
conclusion, the court noted that it was foreseeable to the defendant
in Dillon that, when he struck a small child her mother would be in
the vicinity of the accident. Thus, the crucial issue for the Conte court
was whether the city of San Jose, at the time of the negligent act,
(i.e., the planning and construction of the intersection), could foresee
71. The girl's mother also arrived at the scene of the accident within moments
of the accident, but her action was not part of the present appeal. The trial court
sustained a demurrer to the mother's cause of action with leave to amend so that she
might specify the time interval between the accident and her arrival upon the scene.
72. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
73. The court held that the Dillon rule did not preclude recovery by siblings and
that siblings would indeed be sufficiently related to warrant recovery. As a matter
of fact, Dillon itself let stand a recovery by the sister of the accident victim in that
case. Civil No. 30433 (1st Dist. Cal. Ct. App., July 24, 1973).
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an accident to a young woman whose immediate relatives would be
near the scene of the accident. The appellate court asserted that,
despite the fact that it might be foreseeable that a pedestrian might
be injured at that particular intersection, it was not foreseeable, at the
time the intersection was planned, that such a pedestrian would also
have relatives nearby who would suffer emotional trauma thereby.
74
The important point to notice in Conte is the absence of any ref-
erence, in the majority opinion, to the three factors enumerated in
Dillon.75  In relation to the brothers' causes of action, all three factors
had been satisfied; the plaintiffs were at or near the scene of the acci-
dent, they did experience sensory perception of the accident, and they
were closely related. Nevertheless, the court ruled that the foresee-
ability requirements had not been satisfied. Foreseeability of pres-
ence was determined by the extrinsic surroundings of the scene of
the accident.7 6  The significance of this approach is the transferred
emphasis from the factual presence of the plaintiff at the scene of
the accident to the extrinsic facts noticeable by the defendant in deter-
mining whether the presence of the bystander was reasonably foresee-
able. In the more than six years since Dillon was decided, the Cal-
ifornia courts, with the exception of Archibald, have refused to grant
recovery for mental distress to bystanders. The decisions have at-
tempted to confine the Dillon formula to the facts of that case. Per-
haps such a reluctance to permit recovery in other fact situations is
based on the courts' fear of ultimately rendering a negligent tortfeasor
liable to infinite liability.
In cases such as Dillon and Conte, the element of the plaintiff's
presence at the scene of the accident is a threshhold question. Such
cases necessarily involve both a foreseeability of presence and a fore-
74. "Whatever peril was created or allowed to exist by the city was common to
all pedestrians. An aged person bereft of relatives was as likely a victim as was the
decedent." Id.
75. See text accompanying note 28 supra. It is also important to note that the
sole reference to such factors is done by the dissenting judge who maintained that a
cause of action is stated in such cases when the plaintiff has stated that such injuries
were reasonably foreseeable to the defendant and that foreseeability is determined by
the three factors contained in Dillon. Thus, although the dissenting judge concedes
that the father's cause of action must fail according to Deboe, the brothers of the de-
cedent have stated a cause of action by alleging the presence of all three factors in
accordance with the principle stated in Archibald.
76. See text accompanying note 52 supra. Thus, the majority asserted: "An ac-
cident to a minor near a school, witnessed by parent or sibling, might justify an action
based on the special liability doctrine of Dillon v. Legg. Also a pitfall hazard which
exposes children to special danger, an attractive nuisance, or such an act as in Archi-
bald v. Braverman ...may well lead to Dillon liability. The presence of parents,
brothers and sisters near some of such exposure to danger may be foreseeable to a
sufficient degree." Civil No. 30433 (1st Dist. Cal. Ct. App., July 24, 1973).
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seeability of injury. One element without the other is meaningless;
yet, of the two, foresecability of presence must be a mandatory pre-
requisite. How can the foreseeability of injury to a bystander exist
without first establishing the likelihood of the individual's presence?
If a rational foreseeability test includes the foreseeability of pres-
ence, it is submitted that the three "determinants" contained in Dil-
lon77 bear no logical relationship to the general issue of such foresee-
ability. For example, how does the fact that the plaintiff was at or
near the scene of the accident render it foreseeable to the defendant
that the plaintiff would be at the scene of the accident?
Foreseeability of presence cannot be determined by whether the
plaintiff is in fact at the scene of the accident, nor that the plaintiff
is in fact related to the victim of the accident, nor that the plaintiff
directly perceived the accident. Foreseeability of presence realisti-
cally depends upon facts similar to those enumerated in D'Ambra, such
as the time of day in which the accident occurred, the type of neigh-
borhood involved, the defendant's knowledge of the neighborhood. 78
The Dillon court presumed that the presence of a parent was
reasonably foreseeable in any accident involving a small child. It must
be conceded that, once the presence of the parent is established, injury
to a young child will normally result in severe mental distress in a
witnessing parent. However, the three determinants of foreseeability
in Dillon do not establish foreseeability of presence. They are mean-
ingful aids only in determining the foreseeability of injury.
While a general presumption as to the presence of a parent is
probably correct in an accident involving a small child, what test can
be used if the accident victim is not a small child? Was Archibald,9
a case involving a thirteen-year-old boy, correct in apparently presum-
ing that the boy's mother would be in the vicinity? Under certain
circumstances known by the defendant, the court might be justified
in finding such a degree of foreseeability. 80 Conte sought to empha-
size the concept of foreseeability of presence in a case involving an
eighteen-year-old girl, but the appellate court's opinion has suffered
a most confusing fate.8 ' In view of the fact that virtually every post-
Dillon case in California has failed to even mention foreseeability of
77. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
78. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
79. See text accompanying notes 54-57 supra.
80. For example, if the store in which the boy made his purchase was in a rural
area which would necessitate the boy being driven to the store, then the storeowner
might reasonably foresee that at least one of the boy's parents would be in the vicinity.
Yet, if the store was in the same specific area as that in which the boy lived, no such
foreseeability would ensue.
81. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
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presence, the California Supreme Court should take the first opportu-
nity to clarify this most perplexing question and provide the courts of
this state with a thoroughly rational means of limiting liability. Per-
haps in doing so, California will create a doctrine which will receive
greater acceptance in other states than Dillon and its progeny have
received so far.
Conclusion
In the past six years many courts outside of California have re-
jected the formula announced in Dillon v. Legg because they thought
it would lead to unlimited liability for a negligent defendant. How-
ever, two jurisdictions have followed the Dillon trend. Hawaii adopted
a "reasonable man" approach which is perhaps more liberal than the
approach taken in Dillon and is certain to enlarge a defendant's liabil-
ity and thus guarantee its rejection elsewhere. A federal district court
in Rhode Island has accepted Dillon with one sensible addition which
would restrict liability. Most of the post-Dillon California decisions
are seemingly designed to limit Dillon to its facts. Unlimited liability
is again the underlying rationale. But Dillon need not be restricted
to its facts to assure limited liability. The approach taken in Conte
v. San Jose sought to inject an added restriction which would guarantee
a reasonable limit to liability, but the California Supreme Court has
decided to treat this opinion as if it had never existed.
This note has sought to explain why Dillon has not been more
persuasive to many courts and to enunciate a minor modification which
might make such a formula more acceptable. It is hoped that the
California Supreme Court will recognize the unfavorable formula it
has created and will take the necessary steps to modify its position
so as to provide a sounder and more acceptable theory.
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